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Much contemporary philosophy o f language has shown considerable interest in the relation
between our linguistic practice and our metaphysical commitments, and this interest has begun to
influence work in the history o f philosophy as well.1 In his Categories and De interpntatione, Aristotle
presents an analysis o f language that can be read as intended to illustrate an isomorphism between
the ontology of the real world and how we talk about that world. Our understanding o f language is
at least in part dependent upon our understanding o f the relationships that exist among the endur
ing πράγματα that we come across in our daily experience. Part o f the foundations underlying Ar
istotle’s doctrine o f categories seems to have been a concern, going back to the Academy, about the
problem o f false propositions: language is supposed to be a tool for communicating the way things
are, and writers in antiquity were often puzzled by the problem o f how we are to understand pro
positions that claim that reality is other than it is.2 Aristotle’s analysis o f propositions raises a par
ticular problem in this regard: if the subject o f a proposition does not refer to anything how can
the proposition be useful for talking about a state o f the world? The problem falls into two separate
but related parts: propositions whose subjects are singular terms and hence make claims about some
particular thing and propositions whose subjects are general terms and hence make claims about
classes. In this paper I will explain Aristotle’s treatment o f each kind, focusing in particular on what
has widely been perceived as a problem in his treatment o f singular terms. My discussion o f his
treatment o f general terms will be more brief, but will show that his treatment o f them is consistent
with his treatment o f singular terms.
1. Singular terms
In a paper that he called his finest philosophical essay,3 Bertrand Russell maintained that
definite descriptions make implicit existence claims. For example, Russell claims that the sentence
“The king o f France is bald” tacitly says that there is some person who is presently the king o f
France. This is usually given in symbols as:
[1]

(3>r) { {Kx & (y)[K y id (x = j/)]} & Bx}

where K —“is the king o f France” and B = “is bald”. Since there is, in fact, no king o f France at
present (pardon my Republican prejudice), this sentence is false; hence, if this is how sentences
containing definite descriptions are to be handled, any sentence containing a definite description as
subject will be false if there is no entity fitting the definite description. This result can be seen most
1
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3

An interesting treatm ent o f this topic that illustrates how such concerns intersect w ith issues in the history o f
philosophy can be found in Cora D iam ond, The Realistic S pirit Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the M ind (Cambridge, M A
MIT Press, 1996), Introduction II (pp. 13-38). C. W. A W hittaker, Aristotle’s D e interpretatione: Contradiction and
Dialectic (Oxford: O xford U niversity Press, 1996), also touches on these them es.
On the treatm ent by ancient philosophers o f the problem o f falsehood see N icholas D enyer, Language, Thought and
Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1991).
Bertrand Russell, “O n denoting”, in Robert Charles March , ed.. Logic and Knowledge (London: Unwin Hyman
1905), pp. 41-56.
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clearly when we remember that one o f the ways o f reading the existential quantifier is: “There is
some X such th a t..
Aristotle appears to have held a similar doctrine, though he does n o t enunciate it in terms
o f definite descriptions. Instead he makes the following claim: any sentence that ascribes a property
to some subject entails that the subject o f that sentence exists. This can be given in symbols as:
[2]

Fa ZD (3x) (x = a)

This doctrine is most clearly stated at the end o f the tenth chapter o f the Categories (13M2-35; I
quote this passage in extenso because o f its importance to the argument o f this paper; to facilitate
referencing between the Greek and English I have underscored certain passages in the Greek and
their English equivalents in the translation):4
ού μην ά λ λ α μ ά λ ισ τα δόξειεν ά ν το τοιοΰτο σ υ μ β α ίνειν έπ ί τω ν κ α τ ά
συμπλοκήν έναντίω ν λεγομένων, — το γάρ ύ γ ια ίν ε ιν Σωκράτη τω νοσ ειν
Σωκράτη έναντίον έστίν,— ά λ λ ’ ούδ’ έπ ί τούτω ν ά να γκ α ίο ν ά ε ί θάτερον
μέν άληθές θάτερον δέ ψ εύδος είναι* οντος μέν νάρ Σω κράτους ε σ τα ι τό
μεν άληθές το δέ ψεύδος, μή οντος δέ άμφότερα ψευδή* ούτε γάρ το νοσ ειν
Σωκράτη ούτε τό ύ γ ια ίν ε ιν άληθές αυτού μή οντος δλω ς τού Σω κράτους.
έπ ι δέ τής στερήσεως κ α ι τής εξεω ς μή οντος γε δλω ς ουδέτερον άληθές,
οντος δέ ούκ ά εί θάτερον άληθές* τό γάρ ό ψ ιν ε χ ε ιν Σωκράτη τω τυφ λόν
ε ίν α ι Σωκράτη ά ν τίκ ειτα ι ώς στέρησις κ α ι έξις, κ α ι οντος γ ε ούκ
ά να γκ α ίο ν θάτερον άληθές ε ίν α ι ή ψεύδος, — δτε γάρ μήπω πέφ υκεν εχ ειν,
άμφότερα ψευδή,— μή οντος δέ δλω ς τού Σω κράτους κ α ι ούτω ψ ευδή
άμφότερα, κ α ι τό δ ψ ιν αυτόν ε χ ε ιν κ α ι τό τυφλόν είνα ι, έπ ι δέ γε τής
καταφ άσεω ς κ α ί τής άποφάσεω ς άεί, έά ν τε ή έά ν τε μή ή, τό μέν ετερον
εσ τα ι ψ εύδος τό δέ ετερον άληθές* τό γάρ νοσ ειν Σωκράτη κ α ι τό μή
νοσειν Σωκράτη, οντος τε αύτού φανερόν δ τι τό ετερον αύτώ ν άληθές ή
ψεύδος, κ α ι μή οντος ομοίως* τό μέν γάρ νοσ ειν μή οντος ψ εύδος, τό δέ μή
νοσειν άληθές* ώ στε έπ ί μόνων τούτω ν ίδ ιο ν ά ν είη τό ά ε ί θάτερον αύτώ ν
άληθές ή ψ εύδος είνα ι, δσ α ώ ς κ α τά φ α σ ις κ α ί άπόφ α σις ά ν τίκ ειτα ι.
It might, indeed, very well seem that the same sort o f thing does occur in the case o f
contraries said with combination, ‘Socrates is well’ being contrary to ‘Socrates is sick’.
Yet n ot even with these is it necessary always for one to be true and the other false.
For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, but if he does n o t both will be
false; neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ will be true if Socrates himself
does n o t exist at all. As for possession and privation, if he does n o t exist at all nei
ther is true, while not always one or the other is true if he does. For ‘Socrates has
sight’ is opposed to ‘Socrates is blind’ as possession to privation; and if he exists it is
not necessary for one or the other to be true or false (since until the time when it is
natural for him to have it both are false), while if Socrates does n o t exist at all then
again both are false, both h e has sight’ and h e is blind’. But with an affirmation and
negation one will always be false and the other true whether he exists or n o t. For
take ‘Socrates is sick’ and ‘Socrates is not sick’: if he exists it is clear that one or the
other o f them will be true or false, and equally if he does not: for if he does n o t exist
4

The Greek text cited throughout is that o f M inio-Paluello’s O CT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949). A ll
translations, unless otherw ise indicated, are taken from John L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categories and D e interpretatione
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1963), since that translation represents what I w ill shortly call the received view .
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Tie is sick’ is false but lie is not sick’ true. Thus it would be distinctive o f these
alone— opposed affirmations and negations—that always one or the other o f them
is true or false.
The most common interpretation o f this passage—which I will call the received view—
takes Aristotle to be saying the following three things. First, some affirmations affirm predicates
that are contrary in nature, e.g. “is sick” and “is well”. When these affirmations are made o f a sub
ject that exists, one is true and the other false, but if they are made o f a subject that does not exist,
then they are both false. Second, some affirmations affirm predicates that are n o t contradictory but
that are nevertheless opposed to one another as possession to privation, e.g. “has sight” and “is
blind”. When these affirmations are made o f a subject that exists, it is n o t necessary that one be
true and the other be false, since both may be false; it is not possible that both be true, however,
and if the subject does not exist, then necessarily both are false. Third, when statements are op
posed as affirmation to negation, then necessarily one o f them will be true and the other false re
gardless o f whether the subject exists or not. The reason is that the denial will be true whenever the
subject does not exist (if something does not exist, then it has no properties at all, so it will be true
to say, with respect to some particular property, that the non-existent thing does n o t have it), but
the affirmation will be false because of existential import; and if the subject does exist then the two
statements are a variation o f the case o f affirmations of contradictory properties, and one must be
true and the other false. The received view is summarized in the following table:
Subject exists
Necessarily, one false and
Contradictory assertions (Fa, the other true
Ga, where G contradicts
sense o f F)

Subject does n o t exist
Necessarily, both false

Possession vs. privation (Fa,
Ga, where G is the privation
of F)

One false and one true, or
both false

Necessarily, both false

Assertions vs. denials (Fa,
~Fa)

Necessarily, one false and
the other true

Necessarily, one false and
the other true

Most commentators,5 however, think that this passage from the Categories is at odds with
what Aristotle says in De interpretaüone 11 21a25-28):
ώσπερ 'Ό μηρός έσ τί τι, oîjov ποιητής* αρ’ obv κ α ι εστιν, ή οΰ; κ α τά
συμβεβηκός γαρ κ ατηγορείται τό εσ τιν του 'Ομήρου* ότι γάρ ποιητής εστιν,
ά λ λ ’ ου καθ’ αυτό, κατηγορείται κ α τά του 'Ομήρου το εστιν.

5

In particular see Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and D e interpretatione, Eugene B ab in , The Theory of Opporition in
Aristotle (Notre D am e, IN: N otre Dam e University Press, 1940), Russell M. D ancy , Sense and Contradiction: A Study
in Aristotle (Dordrecht, 1975), M anley T hom pson, “O n Aristotle’s square o f opposition”, in J. Μ. E . M oravcsik,
ed., Aristotle (Garden City, N Y , 1967), pp. 55-57, N icholas W hite , “Origins o f A ristotle’s essentialism ”, Temew of
Metaphysics 2β (1973), 62-72.
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For example, Homer is something (say, a poet). Does it follow that he is? No, for
the ‘is’ is predicated accidentally o f Homer; for it is because he is a poet, n o t in its
own right, that the ‘is’ is predicated o f Homer.
The received view reads this passage as assuming that the sentence “Homer is a poet” is true, but
that “Homer is” nevertheless does n ot follow from i t The problem is this. If “Homer is a poet” is
true, there must be someone named H om er who is a poet; but in this case to say that “Homer is”
ought to be true as well. But if Homer is dead or otherwise does not exist (i.e., if it is not true to say
that “Homer is”), how could “Homer is a poet” be true given what Aristotle has said in the Categones? Has Aristotle contradicted himself? Most commentators think that he has. Later on I will sug
gest a reading o f the De interpretatione passage that does not attribute such a contradiction to Aris
totle, but first I would like to underscore the metaphysical underpinnings o f these passages by tak
ing a close look at a rival interpretation by William Jacobs.6
According to Jacobs there is no real contradiction; what has been perceived as a contradic
tion is really nothing more than an artifact o f the received view’s translation o f the Categoúes pas
sage. On Jacobs’ reading o f the passage, Aristotle is not claiming that an assertion is false if its sub
ject does not exist. Jacobs claims that the genitives absolute (underlined in the Greek text and the
English translation o f the Categoúes passage) that are traditionally translated as “if Socrates exists/does not exist” should n o t be translated that way at all, but rather as “o f Socrates’ being”,
where this is understood to refer to Socrates’ essence rather than his existence. Thus, when Aris
totle says that neither “Socrates is sick” no r “Socrates is well” will be true if Socrates himself “is n o t
at all”, according to Jacobs what he means is that if Socrates is n o t what he is— if he is n o t the sort
o f entity that his essence picks out, that is, a living being—then neither “sick” nor “well” can truly
be predicated o f him. The reason for this, on Jacobs’ view, is that “sick” and “well” are predicates
that can only be asserted o f living beings. The sentences “Socrates is sick” and “Socrates is well”
will both be false not because there is no Socrates, but because we can no more predicate “sick” or
“well” of something that is not a living thing than we can predicate “odd” or “even” o f something
that is not a number. So on Jacobs’ account the Categoúes passage has nothing to do with existential
import in singular sentences, and hence cannot be read as contradicting the De interpretatione ac
count. Jacobs is not happy with the received view’s treatment o f the De interpretatione passage either,
but let me say a word about his analysis o f the Categoúes passage before turning to what he has to
say about the De interpretatione.
His analysis rests on his interpretation o f the genitives absolute, so it will be necessary to
make something o f a philological digression here. The genitive absolute, in Greek, bears a passing
resemblance to what has sometimes been called the nominative absolute in English, but its usage is
far more common. Briefly, the genitive absolute is a clause that stands grammatically apart from the
rest of the sentence in which it occurs; normally it consists o f a noun and a participle in the genitive
case, though it may contain other words in other cases. Standardly the genitive absolute is used to
convey information that is circumstantial to that o f the main clause, expressing either the time at
which the main clause was true, the causes o f what is expressed in the main clause, the conditions
under which the main clause is true, a concession that limits the sense o f the main clause, or the
attendant circumstances of the main clause. Most o f these categories are reducible to the last.7
Jacobs appears to be claiming that Socrates’ being what he is is part o f the attendant cir
cumstances that would make assertions o f his sickness or wellness true or false. But this would re6
7

W illiam Jacobs, “A ristotle and N onreferring Subjects”, Phronesis 24 (1979), 282-300.
For a full discussion o f the nature and use o f the genitive absolute, see Raphael K ühner and Bernhard Gerth,
Ausführliche Grammatik dergriechischen Sprache (Hannover. H ahnsche, 1904), §485, especially pp. 78-79.
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quire that the Greek word ών, the present participle o f the verb “to be”, have the technical mean
ing “essence”. This would be unusual for two reasons, one philological and the other philosophical.
From a philological perspective such a usage is quite strange: if Jacobs is right, then this is the only
place in all of Aristotle where a participle o f the verb “to be” in a genitive absolute does not have a
non-technical meaning like “to be” or “to exist”. As a matter o f fact, it would probably be the only
place in all of Greek literature where a genitive absolute consisting o f a noun plus the present parti
ciple of the verb “to be” would not be existential or copulative in meaning. In other words, what
Jacobs is suggesting here would be a hapax kgomenon—a linguistic usage with no other attestation
than the present passage. If, by some stretch o f the imagination, Jacobs has indeed found a strange
new use of the verb “to be” in a genitive absolute, we would have to find some way o f squaring this
usage with the fact that Aristotle uses the subjunctive o f the verb to be in 13b28 to express the
same idea that he is supposedly expressing with genitives absolute everywhere else; but I fear that
the limits of credulity have already been reached.
The philosophical grounds for doubting Jacobs’ suggestion are just as telling. First o f all, it
would be surprising to find Aristotle using the present participle o f the verb “to be” in the technical
meaning “essence”: Aristotle has other expressions for “essence”, none o f which involve the pres
ent participle o f the verb “to be”. Second, if Aristotle were saying what Jacobs claims he is saying, it
would be inconsistent with what Aristotle elsewhere has to say about essences. Jacobs translates our
passage from the Categories as follows:
It might, indeed, very well seem that such happens [i.e. necessarily it will always be
the case that one assertion will be true and the other assertion will be false] in the
case o f those contraries said with combination— “Socrates is well” being contrary to
“Socrates is sick”—but not even as concerns these is it necessary always for one to
be true and the other to be false. For, on the one hand, o f Socrates’ being a living
thing, one will be true and one will be false, while, on the other hand, o f Socrates’
not being a living thing, both will be false. For o f Socrates himself n o t being a living
thing at all, neither “Socrates is sick” nor “Socrates is well” will be true.
Now, it is difficult to imagine what the phrase “o f Socrates’ being a living thing, one will be true and
one will be false” is supposed to mean. O n the one hand, it might mean that “being sick” and
“being well” can be predicated o f Socrates’ essence, “being a living thing”— one truly and the other
falsely. But one does not normally predicate such things o f an essence; indeed, according to Aris
totle’s own doctrine, you cannot predicate anything o f an essence except a higher genus, and it cer
tainly is false to say that “being a living thing” is a species o f “being sick” or “being well”. On the
other hand, it could mean that “being sick” or “being well” can be predicated truly or falsely o f the
state of affairs represented by Socrates’ being a living thing—indeed this comes closest to picking
out what a genitive absolute might have been intended to capture. But apart from the fact that it is
highly unlikely—if not outright impossible— that this is what the Greek actually says, there is the
fact that Aristotle does not normally express predications in this way. Normally when one thing is
predicated of another Aristotle uses the verb κατηγορειν with the genitive; nowhere does he use a
simple genitive with no verb o f saying or asserting. If Jacobs means that one sentence will be “true
o f ’ Socrates’ being a living thing and the other “false o f ’ it, then again he has found a hapax legomenon, for there are no parallel passages o f this sort in Aristotle or any other writer. And regardless o f
how we are to interpret Jacobs here, we will be left wondering what to do with the word ολως, at
13b20, which Jacobs does not bother to translate. It means “at all”, and makes perfectly good sense
if the traditional reading is right in rendering the sentence “if Socrates does not exist at all’; but
what does it mean to say “of Socrates’ n o t being a living thing at all”? To all o f this may be added
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the simple objection that if Socrates did exist he would be a living thing and thus both “sick” and
“well” would be applicable to him even under Jacobs’ interpretation o f the genitives absolute, hence
even if Jacobs is going in the right direction by focusing in on Socrates’ essence, it is still the case
that the truth or falsity o f any assertion about his state o f health is inextricably connected to
whether or not his essence is instantiated, i.e., whether or not he exists.
Finally, it is fair to ask why Jacobs’ reading should be preferred over the traditional one.
There is nothing in particular about the passage in question to suggest that the traditional reading is
impossible, and in light o f the way in which Aristotle normally uses such genitives absolute, Jacobs’
interpretation begins to look a little ad hoc. Indeed, Jacobs’ only reason for claiming that the tradi
tional interpretation is n ot possible is that it appears to leave Aristotle contradicting himself: he
gives no philological reasons why the traditional reading cannot be right, nor does he offer any basis
for thinking that his own reading is grammatically possible. In short, I suggest that Jacobs’ reading is
insupportable.
As far as the passage from the De interpretatione is concerned, Jacobs is happy enough with
the manner in which it has traditionally been translated, but he takes issue with what the received
view takes to be the philosophical point at issue. According to Jacobs, Aristotle’s point in the De
interpretatione passage is that the sentence “Homer is a poet” is a contingent truth; on his view, the
passage has nothing to do with whether “Homer exists” is entailed by “Homer is a poet”, but rather
is about how essential and accidental predicates are related to their subjects. For Jacobs, the ques
tion “Is he or isn’t he” o f 21a26 means “Is he, or is he not, a poet?” But this seems to me n o t only
to be an over-interpretation o f the passage, but to go so far as to ignore the force o f the word κ α ί
at the start o f the question. The word κ α ί is a conjunctive particle in Greek that is basically the
equivalent o f the English conjunction “and”, but it often does a lot more work than merely joining
two clauses together. It is important to note that Greek differs from English in the importance
given to such particles. It is tempting for an English speaker to assume that the function o f such a
word is purely syntactical, that such a word serves only to link two clauses together. But in fact parti
cles o f this sort play a much more important role in conveying the sense o f such a connection be
tween clauses—not every pair o f clauses is linked together in a purely conjunctive way, and that is
why the word κ α ί can be translated in such a wide variety o f ways: “and”, “even”, “also”, etc. Recall
the text o f this passage, and consider the underlined portion (21a25-28):
ώσπερ "Ομηρός έσ τί τι, oîjov ποιητής* άρ’ οΰν κ α ι εστιν. ή οΰ: κ α τά
συμβεβηκός γάρ κ ατηγορείται τό εσ τιν του Όμηρου* οτι γάρ ποιητής εστιν,
ά λ λ ’ ου καθ’ αυτό, κατηγορείται κ α τά του Ό μήρου το εστιν.
For example, Homer is something (say, a poet). Does it follow that he is? No, for
the ‘is’ is predicated accidentally o f Homer; for it is because he is a poet, n o t in its
own right, that the ‘is’ is predicated o f Homer.
There are two points that anyone familiar with Aristotle’s Greek will recogiize immediately. First,
the expression άρ’ ουν at the beginning o f this question normally indicates an inference; second,
the force o f the word κ α ί in the question άρ ουν κ α ι εστιν, ή o b ... must surely be to emphasize
the εσ τιν. I would render the first sentence o f this passage as
Just as Homer is something, say a poet; can we infer from that (άρ’ ουν) that he also is
(και εστιν) or not?
On Jacobs’ reading the word κ α ί is not translated at all. I suppose that he might suggest that it be
read as “can we infer from that that Homer also is a poet or not?” Yet the point o f the first part o f
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this sentence is that Homer actually is something, in this particular case we are asked to presume that
he actually is apoet, so Jacobs would be reduced to saying that the passage means something like “If
we presuppose that Homer is a poet, can we then infer that he is a poet, or not?”. Quite apart from
the rather unsavory result o f attributing puzzlement to Aristotle over the validity o f a tautology, this
reading has nothing to do with the broader context o f the De interpretatione passage, which is about
kinds o f affirmations. To be fair, Jacobs is not ignorant o f this context; but it is curious that he
chooses to ignore completely the καί, which seems to me to be crucial in understanding the thrust
of the question. In particular, Jacobs’ reading leaves one wondering what is the point o f the conclu
sion o f the chapter at 21a32-33:
τό δε μή ον, οτι δοξαστόν, ούκ αληθές ειπ είν ον τι* δόξα γάρ αύτοϋ ούκ
εσ τιν οτι εστιν, ά λ λ ’ οτι ούκ εστιν.
It is not true to say that what is not, since it is thought about, is something that is;
for what is thought about it is n ot that it is, but that it is not.
Thinking about something, having a belief—a δόξα—about something, here seems to be classed as
a kind of predication. But if what we are thinking about that something is that “ούκ εσ τιν”, “it is
not”, we are no t also thinking about it that “εσ τιν”, that “it is”.8 Clearly Aristotle is interested n o t
in whether what is predicated is accidental or essential to the subject, but whether the conceptual
information contained in the predicate can be broken down into constituent parts corresponding to
the parts o f the linguistic expression o f the predicate to form new predications. I take this to be the
crucial sense o f this passage, and I will be returning to this point shortly.
We are again left wondering what it is that is supposed to motivate reading the present pas
sage in any way other than the traditional way. The traditional reading does not conflict with any o f
the surrounding text o f De interpretaüone 21al8-34, which is about the problem o f predicating
something of a subject that, taken conceptually with what it is to be the subject, amounts to a con
tradiction. For example, calling a dead man a man entails a contradiction for, in order to be a man
one must be a living thing, but “dead man” does not indicate a living thing and cannot be truly
predicated of a genuine man (indeed, the predicate “dead man” (τεθνεώτα άνθρωπον) is itself an
oxymoron, on Aristotle’s account; presumably Aristotle means to say that the word “dead”,
τεθνεώ τα cannot be coherently linked with the word “man”, άνθρωπον, either as a subject or as
part o f a complex predicate). Now if we are to be allowed to infer that “Homer is” from “Homer is
a poet”, on Aristotle’s account, then we must be permitted to infer that “Homer is a poet” carries
existential import. But Aristotle notes that the “is” o f “Homer is a poet” cannot be understood
apart from the remainder o f the predicate, i.e., it must be understood as a linguistic component o f
the phrase “is a poet” and should n ot be taken in a metaphysical sense to be predicating existence
simplidter o f him in addition to predicating being-a-poet o f him. Indeed, he goes on immediately to
say that “where predicates both contain no contrariety if definitions are put instead o f names and
are predicated in their own right and n o t accidentally, in these cases it will be true to speak o f the
particular thing even without qualification”, and this appeal to intersubstitutivity appears to under
score the fact that the predicates being considered have to be evaluated in terms o f what they mean\
it is not enough to pick a word from a true predicate and create a new predicate out o f that word
(by some sort o f extended paronymy) and then claim that this new linguistic pastiche can also be
truly predicated metaphysically o f the same subject (for example, we cannot take the true sentence

8

Cf. Metaphysics 1030a25-27.
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“Bill Clinton is president o f the United States” and claim that, because that sentence is true, it is
also true to say: “Bill Clinton is the United States”).
It seems, then, that Jacobs has failed to defend Aristotle from the charge o f inconsistency
leveled at him by the received view. However, I would like to suggest a way out. My suggestion will
n ot involve any quarrel with the received view’s method o f translating these passages; instead I will
be content to show that the De interpretations passage has nothing to do with existential im port and
cannot reasonably be taken to contradict the Categories passage, which has much to do with existen
tial import.
It should be noted from the start that, whereas Aristotle explicitly says in the Categones pas
sage that the sentences “Socrates is sick” and “Socrates is well” will both be false if there is no Soc
rates, and that one o f them will be true and the other false if there is a Socrates, he says nothing
about the truth or falsity of “Homer is a poet”, even though the received view takes him to be sup
posing, for the purposes o f the example, that “Homer is a poet” is true. Indeed, if the received view
is correct, it is precisely this assumption (that “Homer is a poet” is true) that leads to the putative
contradiction, for by introducing the notion o f truth and falsity the received view tacitly injecte the
question o f existential import into the De interpretations passage in spite o f the fact that Aristotle
himself has not mentioned it there. Our passage from the Categones is explicitly about how the exis
tence or non-existence o f a subject affects the truth values o f pairs o f sentences that contain con
tradictory predicates or predicates expressing possessions and privations or statements containing
affirmations and denials. Our De interpretatione passage, however, has nothing to do with the exis
tence of the subjects o f predications, but rather is concerned with the admissibility o f various ways
o f manipulating subjects and predicates: to the extent that the passage has to do with the prooftheoretical notion o f a putative rule o f inference with respect to complex predicates, it is a passage
that is about the syntax and semantics o f predicates and not about existential import.
The chapter can be divided into four closely related parte. In the first Aristotle notes that
some complex predicates do n ot represent metaphysical unities and, hence, count as several asser
tions if predicated o f something that is a metaphysical unity. For example, “white” and “walking”
are purely accidental properties when predicated o f a subject such as “Socrates”, so to say that
“Socrates is a white walking thing” is really to make two assertions about Socrates: that he is white
and that he is walking. But if a complex predicate does represent a metaphysical unity, then it can
be asserted of a subject as a single assertion. For example, “animal”, “two-footed”, and “tame” are
all parts of the essence of “human being”, and so the sentence “Socrates is a tame, two-footed ani
mal” counts as a single assertion even though it has the same grammatical form as “Socrates is a
white walking thing”.
In the second part Aristotle notes that some terms can be truly predicated both separately
and together of some one thing, others cannot. For example if Socrates is a man and is white it is
also true to say that he is a white man, and if he is a white man he is also white and a man; but if
Socrates is good and he is a cobbler it is not necessarily true that he is a good cobbler, and if he is a
good cobbler he is no t necessarily good simpRdter, though he is a cobbler simplidter. This last point
will be particularly important for our understanding o f the Homer passage.
In the third section Aristotle offers two criteria to explain what he said in the first section.
First of all, accidental attributes of something are not sufficient to constitute a metaphysical unity,
nor are subaltérnate properties. For example, “white” and “sitting” are accidental properties o f a
man, so ihey cannot constitute some metaphysical unity that can be predicated o f a man with a
single assertion; and “being a man” is subaltérnate to “being footed” and “being an animal”, so
there is no metaphysical unity “being a footed man” or “being an animal man” that can be opposed
to “being a non-footed man” or “being a non-animal man”.
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The structure o f the fourth section, which contains our Homer example, is rather complex.
Aristotle begins by noting that it is always true to call a particular man a man, and a particular white
man white. But “when in what is added some opposite is contained from which a contradiction
follows” (21a21-22) such assertions will always be false. (It is important to note that Aristotle says
“follows”, επεταί; this word indicates that the problem is one o f inference.) For example, it is false
to call a dead man a man because the concept o f “man” contains the concept o f “being a living
thing” while the concept o f “dead man” (if τεθνεώ τα άνθρωπος,per impossibile, could count as a
concept) contains the concept o f “not being a living thing”. The assertion “the dead man is a man”
allows us to infer, by replacing names with definitions, that “the non-living thing is a living thing”,
which is absurd. Now, the verb “to be” presents us with a special case, because it can be either ex
istential or copulative. Aristotle claims that in a sentence like “Homer is a poet” the verb “to be” is
playing a copulative role and is n o t predicating existence o f Homer. For this reason we may n o t in
fer “Homer exists” from “Homer is a poet”, because the word “is” in “Homer is a poet” serves a
function analogous to the “is” in “Homer is running”, and we may n o t take apart a predicate like “is
running” or “is a poet” and assert separately its constituent parts o f a subject any more than we can
assert “Brussells sprouts are good” on the grounds that “Brussells sprouts are good for you”. This is
a point about the structure and semantic content o f the predicate and would be true regardless o f
the existence of the subject of the predication.9
We can contrast this final section o f our chapter o f De interpretatione with the tenth chapter
of the Categories by putting the matter this way. The Categories passage has to do with an entailment
relation that holds o f certain kinds of assertions, while the De interpretatione passage rejects a putative
rule o f inference for use with predicates containing the verb “to be” (and by extension makes a
claim about the semantics of predicates generally). In the Categories Aristotle is implicitly saying that
any sentence of the form “a is F ’ entails the sentence “a exists”; in the De interpretatione passage, on
the other hand, Aristotle is concerned to show that there is no valid inferential move from a predi
cate “is F ’ to an existential predicate “is” within the context o f the semantic content o f the predi
cate alone. In other words, “being F ’ differs in an essential way from “being simpääteC: it is the dif
ference between the copulative and existential uses o f the verb είνα ι, and Aristotle quite rightly
notes that we cannot extract “existence” as a predicate from another predicate whose linguistic ex
pression contains only the word “is” as a syntactical connector linking a subject to a semantic predi
cate.10 To allow such a move would be to allow a move from Fa to Ga, where F and G represent
different predicates; without some sort o f axiom or theorem to allow such a move there is no com
pelling reason to accept such an inference, and no t only are there no compelling reasons to warrant
such an axiom or theorem, Aristotle seems to be at pains to explain where there should be no such
axiom or theorem.

9
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I f I understand him correctly, m y interpretation is n ot inconsistent with that o f M ichael W edin, “A ristotle on the
Existential Import o f Singular Sentences”, Phronesis 24 (1979) 179-196, but his view is a syntactical one, whereas
m y view is that the semantic structure o f the predicate is fondamental in blocking the inference. A ccording to
what W edin calls the “non-decom position” principle, the “is” o f “H om er is a poet” is predicated accidentally
(κα τά συμβεβηκός) o f Hom er and such predications m ay n ot be “detached” to form new predications saka
veritate (pp. 186-187).
O n the question o f the copulative and existential uses o f the verb “to be” in Greek see Charles H . Kahn , The
Verb T e’ in Ancient Greek, Part 6 o f John W. M. V erhaar, ed.. The Verb *Be’ and its Synonyms: Philosophical and
Grammatical Studies, volum e 16 o f Morris Halle et aL, edd.. Foundations o f Language, Supplementary Series (D ordrecht D .
Reidel 1973), “The Role o f nous in the C ognition o f First Principles in Posterior Analytics I I 19”, in Enrico Berti, ed.,
Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics. Proceedings o f the Fight Sympotium Aristotelicum (Padova: Editrice
Antenore, 1981), and Lesley Brown, ‘T h e Verb ‘to be’ in Greek Philosophy: Som e Remarks”, in Stephen E verson,
ed.. Companions to Anrient Thought 3: Language (Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity Press, 1994) pp. 212-236.
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So far nothing in my analysis would warrant drawing the conclusion that Aristotle has con
tradicted himself- The received view goes too far in trying to tie the example from the De
interpretaüone to the lesson o f the Categories', the existence o f Homer is not what is at issue. It is true
enough that the sentence “Homer is a poet” entails “H om er exists”, but when Aristotle says that
we may not infer “Homer exists” from “Homer is a poet” he is not saying that “Homer is a poet”
does not entail “Homer exists”, he is saying that we may n o t decompose a complex predicate into
its constituent parts if it contains a copulative “to be”, and in particular we may not convert a
copulative “to be” into an existential “to be”. If Aristotle had chosen a different example, one that
did n ot involve the verb “to be”, the putative contradiction might never have been an issue, but it is
precisely because o f the dual nature o f the verb “to be” that it seems a particularly natural example.
This fallacious conversion between the copulative and the existential uses o f the verb “to
be” was a greater risk in the dialectical practices o f Aristotle’s day than in our own, because Greek
had only the one verb for both meanings. In English we never say “Mary exists running”, and
everyone knows that “Mary is running” is not semantically equivalent to “Mary exists running”. We
might think that “Mary is running” entails “Mary exists” or we might not—but either way we know
that you can’t replace, salva veritate (or even salva mente), the “is” o f “is running” with the definition
o f “exists”, and this is precisely Aristotle’s point in our passage from the De interpretaüone.
Aristotle notes that the “is” in “Homer is a poet” is only predicated o f Homer by virtue o f
its being a part o f the predicate “is a poet”; the “is” is n o t a genuine instance o f predication, but an
accidental sort (κατά συμβεβηκός 21a26-27), by which he presumably means to say that the “is”
in “Homer is a poet” is not, all by itself, actually predicating anything o f Homer, but only insofar as
it is connected to “poet”, thus completing the sense o f the predicate. In other words, Aristotle here
draws a distinction between something that is a predicate in the primary sense o f that word, and
something that is not a predicate in the primary sense, but rather is a predicate only in an accidental
sense.11 This brings me to one final point about Jacobs’ reading o f our passages.
Jacobs rejects the idea that Aristotle here has in mind the difference between predicates that
are predications essentially and predicates that are predications only accidentally; he claims that what
Aristotle has in mind is instead the difference between predications o f accidental and predications
o f essential properties. Being a poet, on Jacobs’ reading, is an accidental property that Homer has,
while existing is an essential property. It seems to me that there are two problems with this view.
First, it is n ot clear that Aristotle would have regarded existence as a property o f any sort, let alone
o f an essential so rt Usually one thinks o f predicates such as “man” or “animal” when one thinks of
the essential properties o f a subject like Homer. An essential property is what makes a thing what it
is, but existence is common to everything and does n o t count as a principle o f differentiation.12
“Homer is a man” or “Homer is a rational biped” predicate essential properties o f Homer, but
“Homer exists” does no t assert a property that can be used to tell us what it is to be Homer.
Second, Jacobs appears to be insisting that, because Aristotle speaks o f accidental and essen
tial predicates at 21a7-17, he must still be speaking about them in 21al8-33, but this is n o t at all
clear.13 For one thing, Aristotle is not primarily concerned with accidental and essential predicates
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Here I part com pany w ith W edin (182), w ho reads κ α τά συμ β εβ η κ ός in a slightly different way: the “is” in
‘H om er is a poet” attributes accidental being to H om er, as opposed to καθ’ αί>τό being (Metapbytics Δ 7). I agree
with W edin (186), contraJacobs (see below ), that A ristotle is n o t concerned here with sentences that express κ α τά
συμβεβηκ ός predications.
C£ PosteriorAnalytics 2.7 92bl3: “existence is n ot the essence o f anything”.
In an appendix (p. 295), Jacobs makes the rather bold claim that “A ristotle never uses the expressions κα θ’
α ύ τ ό /κ α τ ά συμβεβηκός τό ο ν (and its cognates) to denote anything other than the difference betw een using
“is” (and its cognates) to assert what is essential and what is accidental” (emphasis in the original). This seem s to
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even in 21a7-17. It is true that he is talking about predicates that are accidentel in some way, but his
point is that when they are combined in certain ways they are not predicates simplidter; because they
no longer assert one thing of one thing.
An examination o f PostenorAnalytics 1.22 83al5-17 supports reading the distinction being
drawn here in the way I am suggesting. Aristotle says that predicating, say, “white” o f “log” is predi
cation simplidter, but predicating “white”, say, o f “the musical” is either not predication at all
(μηδαμώς κατηγορειν), or else predication only accidentally and not simplidter (κατηγορειν μέν
μή απλώς, κα τά συμβεβηκός δέ κατηγορειν). At the beginning o f the passage in which he dis
cusses the Homer sentences, Aristotle notes that his topic is predication simpddtervñúi respect to
individuals (αληθές δ’ έσ τίν ειπ ειν κ α τά του τίνος κ α ι απλώς, 21al8-19); and this after dis
cussing predications involving complex predicates that are κ α τά συμβεβηκός. The similarity o f
language and subject matter seems sufficient to warrant concluding that Aristotle does, in fact, have
in mind here the distinction between predications simplidter and predications in a derivative sense,
rather than the distinction between predications o f accidental and essential properties.
To sum up, then: although Jacobs fails to rescue Aristotle from the putative contradiction
of which he is accused by the received view, he can be saved nevertheless. He accepts existential
import for singular subjects and disallows conversion o f a copulative “to be” into an existential “to
be” on the grounds that there is no intersubstitutivity o f definition for the two uses o f the verb
είν α ι, and this result can be generalized to any similarly complex predicate.
2. General Terms
So far we have considered only those sentences whose subjects are singular terms: I turn
now to a consideration o f Aristotle’s treatment o f non-referring general terms. We know from the
Prior Analytics that, according to the Laws o f Subaltemation, universal statements have existential
import (AaB entails AiB, AeB entails AoB), but he was aware that general terms could be non-de
noting. His favorite example o f a non-denoting general term was τραγέλαφος, a combination o f
the Greek words τράγος, he-goat, and ελαφος, deer, the compound usually being rendered into
English as “goat-stag”.14 This particular general term presents a slightly different problem than does
“Socrates” or “Homer”, since Aristotle believed that both Socrates and Homer had existed at some
time even if they did not exist in his own time;15 but there had never been any goat-stags n or would
there ever be. So no statement asserting properties o f goat-stags can be true according to the crite
ria o f Categories 10. If no true assertions can be made about goat-stags, what can we possibly know
about them? Does the word “goat-stag” have any meaning at all? At De interpretaúone 1 16al6-18
Aristotle says:
κ α ι γάρ ό τραγέλαφος σ ημαίνει τι, οΰπω δέ αληθές ή ψευδός, έά ν τό ε ίν α ι
ή μή είν α ι προστεθή ή άπλώ ς ή κ α τά χρόνον.
For even “goat-stag” signifies something, but n o t yet something either true or false,
unless “is” or “is not” be added, either simplidter or with respect to time.

14
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fly in the face o f Posterior Analytics 1.22 83al-24, where there seem s to be no other choice than to read the
distinction as one betw een primary and derivative senses.
A ristotle did not coin the term: it is found in Aristophanes (Wasps 937) and Plato (Repubüc 488a).
See Physics 221b31-32.
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The word σ η μ α ίνειν sometimes been offered as the Greek equivalent o f the English “to mean”,
but there are good reasons for being wary about accepting such an equivalence.16 The literal mean
ing o f the word is well established: it means “to show by means o f a sign, to indicate, to point out”.
It is related to the noun σημειον, a “sign” or “token”. Smoke, according to Aristotle, is a σημεΐον
o f fire; other writers speak o f similar relations: a trumpet-blast is the σημειον o f the beginning o f
battle, a signet-ring is a σημειον o f an oath, and tracks in the snow are σ η μ εία o f an animal’s
proximity. If this is supposed to be Aristotle’s word for “meaning” then his notion o f meaning is
very different from ours, for though smoke “means” fire, smoke does not, by itself, have meaning
in our sense. And Aristotle himself is careful to restrict what he has to say about language to spoken
sounds that are significant by convention: he does n o t suggest that smoke is a medium o f commu
nication that exists between a fire and a human observer. So this passage from the De interpretatione
cannot be safely interpreted to be claiming that a word like “goat-stag” has “meaning” even though
there are no goat-stags. So what is this passage claiming?
If we are to take the σ η μ αίνει o f 16al7 quite literally, then the passage is claiming that the
word “goat-stag” indicates something by means o f its status as a signifier. Aristotle is vague about
what is signified: “goat-stag” σ η μ α ίνει τι, it “signifies somethin¿\ but he does n o t say what. We
know that it cannot signify a real, particular goat-stag, the way “Socrates” or “Homer” signify real,
particular men— i.e., “goat-stag” is not the name o f an individual or a rigid designator. What, ex
actly, does it signify? Perhaps it is meant to be like the word “man” or “horse”, a name o f a class.
For Aristotle, a class name signifies an essence: what it is to be a member o f the class. So the term
“goat-stag”, if it were going to signify a class at all, ought to signify what it would be for something
to be a member o f the class o f goat-stags: it ought to signify το τφ τραγελάφω είνα ι.
How do we know what it is to be a goat-stag? According to Aristotle, a definition can tell us
what it is to be something. But definitions have a kind o f existential import o f their own: according
to the PosteriorAnalytics (2.7) to know what something is, to know its scientific definition, presup
poses the knowledge that it is. So we cannot come to know what it is to be a goat-stag by means o f
any process of scientific definition; indeed, there can be no scientific definitions o f goat-stags if
there are no goat-stags. Indeed, Aristotle here reiterates his claim about goat-stags from De
interpretatione 1 (Posterior Analytics 2.1 92b 5-8):
τό γάρ μη ον ούδείς οϊδεν δ τι έστίν, ά λ λ α τ ί μέν σ η μ α ίνει ό λόγος ή το
όνομα, όταν εϊπω τραγέλαφος, τί δ’ έσ τι τραγέλαφ ος αδύνα τον είδέναι.
O f that which does not exist, no one knows what it is. You may know what the ac
count or the name signifies when I say “goat-stag”, but it is impossible to know
what a goat-stag is.
But we are still left wondering what it is, exactly, that the name “goat-stag” or its account (λόγος)
could possibly signify, at least in Aristotle’s view. This is a question that falls outside o f the scope o f
this paper, so I will conclude with some remarks o f a very general kind that I think will put this
problem into the context o f inference and semantics that I stressed in the first part o f the paper.
If we allow a term such as “goat-stag” to stand for a concept then we do not need to insist
that the concept have a scientific definition associated with it—an informal or ostensive definition
will suffice to give sense to the word λόγος in the PosteriorAnalytics passage above. An informal
definition o f “goat-stag” might include imaginings, standardized within the culture by means o f
16
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conventionalization, o f what the offspring o f a goat and a stag might look like. This sort o f λόγος
will not tell you what it is to be a goat-stag, because "goat-stag” is n o t the name o f a genuine, scien
tific class and, hence, there is no such thing as what it is to be a goat-stag. However, it will enable
you to understand sentences in which the word "goat-stag” is used if you are a member o f the same
culture as the person with whom you are speaking. In this case, as the saying goes, meaning is use.
The language in De interpretations 1 is reminiscent o f Plato’s language o f “interweaving” in
Sophist 262f£; indeed, the same metaphor is used (συμπλοκή). Part o f the project o f De
interpretations seems to be to give an Aristotelian account o f how it is that subject terms combine
with predicate terms to give rise to assertions about relations between metaphysical subjects and
predicates,17 and on this score it seems that Aristotle is in agreement with Plato: false assertions are
not meaningless because they can be understood in terms o f the signification o f their components.
To assert that "Theaetetus flies” is false because, on Plato’s account, the entity picked out by the
word "Theaetetus” cannot "interweave” with the Form denoted by the word "flies”, but (contra the
Eleatics) the assertion is not meaningless because we understand what the two words refer to. Pre
sumably a similar judgment could be made if Theaetetus did not exist: the assertion must be false
(because there is nothing for the Form o f flying to interweave with), but if the word “Theaetetus”
has some use that has been agreed upon in the language community (it refers to a man who, when
alive, was named "Theaetetus”), then the assertion is a meaningful one nonetheless. On this ac
count assertions about goat-stags will have meaning because we understand the use o f the terms
involved, but in attempting to "combine” the pseudo-concept o f a goat-stag with the concept o f
some genuine predicate (i.e., when we add "is” or "is not”), the assertion is rendered false, since
there are no goat-stags for the predicates to combine with.
So even though Aristotle is n ot explicit about the existential import o f sentences containing
non-referring general terms, what he says about definition and essence makes it clear that his
thinking about such terms was consistent with what he said explicitly about non-referring singular
terms in the Categoner. any statement asserting properties o f such terms will be false, suggesting that
sentences containing assertions about general terms also carry existential import.

17

For an extended discussion o f this aspect o f the D e interpretatione, see W hitaker, A ristotle’s D e interpretatione, pp.
35-61.

